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Abstract
Improvements in economic efficiency and productivity are the most important sources
for economic growth and will play a major role in the process of industrial restructuring
in the Russian Federation, which has yet to occur. The Soviet Union left an institutional
vacuum and large economic distortions behind, which set the stage for an established
elite to systematically exploit factors of production for their personal benefit.  Economic
agents lacked the resources and incentives to increase efficiency of the markets they
operated in.
This paper generates some empirical highlights of the outcomes of industrial
transformation from 1987 to 1997 and focuses on one of the most popular theoretical
explanations for industrial output decline during transition, which proves that the initial
need of restructuring causes output decline but brings with it efficiency improvements.
Despite large uncertainties on the accuracy of Russian industrial statistics, the following
results are worth mentioning: (1) Early steps of liberalization, macro-economic
stabilization and the launch of the privatization package did not bring about improved
economic efficiency in industrial production in absolute and relative terms, widening
the economic distance to the rest of the world; (2) Less concentrated and highly
localized industries performed better, which can mainly be explained by the
performance of the resource extracting industries; (3) Price liberalization revealed
increasing returns in industrial production and the contribution of capital to output
declined rapidly, while the contribution of labor increased.
It can be concluded that the increasing domination of resource extractive industries,
combined with economies of scale production of its allied processing industries, will
increasingly widen the disparity of wealth among regions and social layers leading to
further economic and political disintegration of Russia.
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1Restructuring, Efficiency and Output Decline
of Russian Industries and Regions
Michael Obersteiner
1. Introduction
In western economies productivity gains are the most important source for economic
growth and for improvement in the standard of living. Using the resources at hand more
HIIHFWLYHO\ KDV KLVWRULFDOO\ EHHQ IDU PRUH LPSRUWDQW  TXDQWLWDWLYHO\  WKDQ FDSLWDO
formation. Likewise in transition economies, efficiency gains and productivity
improvements in industrial production are among the most important factors for
economic success. However, the institutional set-up guiding economic activities must be
designed so that economic agents do not gain from exploiting arbitrage opportunities
and ‘precios mentirosos’ but rather from real productivity and efficiency improvements
and creation of new markets through innovation.
In this paper the effects of price liberalization and stabilization packages on industrial
performance, measured by efficiency estimates, are assessed. It is argued that the
attempts of early shock therapy largely failed and did not contribute to efficiency gains
in the Russian economy. Aslund (1999) describes the period between 1991 and 1993 as
one where the attempt at radical economic reform was tried, but actual reforms were
slow and partial, leading to extraordinary rent seeking through subsidized credits and
arbitrage in foreign trade. Price and foreign trade liberalization, macro-economic
stabilization and early privatization were the main items on the transition agenda during
the period analyzed. Although the macro-economic factors changed the economics of
firms and industries drastically, successful restructuring and/or relocation in Russian
industries did not take place. Instead, elaborate schemes were designed to guarantee the
persistence of survival networks, which maximize current rents.
However, restructuring will, at least in the long run, constitute the most important
determinant for economic growth in Russia. What we have witnessed so far, has been a
pattern of seemingly disorganized decline across all of the industrial sectors. Despite the
fact that price liberalization and stabilization packages did not bring about the desired
effects of efficiency improvement and expected industrial expansion, the privatization
program was readily implemented. Although, Russia currently appears to have formally
privatized most of the industrial sector, the measures of restructuring are still largely
inadequate to ensure sustainable economic growth and stabilization. On the industry
level the gap to the rest of the world is widening.  This leaves Russian industry largely
non-competitive on the badly performing national market and even less competitive on
international markets. There are, of course, some noteworthy exceptions, mainly in the
natural resource extracting branches of the economy. In addition, industrial enterprises
2still employ far more workers than supported by their levels of output and potential
productivity. Physical capital is largely obsolete as illustrated by the fact that in 1980
the average age of physical capital was 9.5 years, whereas in 1995 it increased to 14.1
years (see Interfax Statistical Report No. 4, 1998) and further increased thereafter.
Compared to OECD levels the average age of Russia’s industrial plants is three times
higher. This is due to the fact that investment activities have virtually ceased in many
industrial branches. Depleting national savings, capital flight, a lack in attracting
(foreign) investors and a banking sector lacking the knowledge and incentives to invest
in the manufacturing sector, left industry largely without financial resources for
technological upgrading. The downward spiral does not seem to have stopped as
investment in fixed capital was 7% lower in 1998 than in 1997, and a further 5–6% drop
is on the horizon for 1999.
In short, Russia’s industrial sector shows every sign of regression from the target of
quick and thorough restructuring. Gaddy and Ickes (1999) argue that the Russian
economy is bifurcating as some enterprises restructure reducing the distance to the
market, while other enterprises exploit relationship capital to survive without
restructuring. The latter involves barter, tax offsets, and survival with enterprise
directors showing paternalistic behavior with labor hoarding as the main enterprise goal.
At the same time, Russian enterprises fail to pay wages. Aslund (1999), argues that
radical economic reform largely failed because of extraordinary rent-seeking by old
enterprise managers through expert rents, subsidized credits, import subsidies and direct
government subsidies, while gaining little from privatization. The existence of powerful
and highly organized business networks, combined with an increasing power vacuum of
the state, led to enormous rent seeking. In many cases, government regulations even
supported the powerful elite to increase and monopolize rents. The resulting structures
from colluding interests of Kremlin technocrats and the business elite was later called
the negotiated economy (‘Ekonomika torga’) (Aven, 1999). Many argue that Russia’s
post communist period has been characterized by the struggle of the newly-rich to
preserve their economic power by preventing liberal reform, which would jeopardize
extraordinary export rents, subsidized credits, import privileges and direct government
subsidies in various forms. Hellman (1998) summarized this consequence of partial
reform as “Winners Take All”. Schleifer and Vishny (1998) call these government
pathologies “The Grabbing Hand”.1
However, since Russia’s last financial debacle in August 1998, the opportunities of
quick money with large margins in trade, GKOs and other fields (‘ne-traditionalnije
pribeli’) have dried up. The devaluation of the Ruble has increased the competitiveness
of Russian goods on the internal market (imports decreased by about 50%). The
devaluation combined with factors such as increased oil prices, little inflow of foreign
financial capital, decreasing share of barter due to increased liquidity, a restructured
banking system, etc., render the model of the ‘virtual economy’ concept obsolete.
Contrarily, this gives justification to the virtual economy concept, where survival
networks were created to retain market share which, taking inter-temporal optimization
into account, would be more costly to regain in the future. Thus, the artificial support of
supply chains, whatever form it took on, makes perfect economic sense if we look at it
from a more dynamic perspective. Liquidity, under the environment of heavy
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 However, their own names appeared in a number of irregularities (see, e.g., Wedel, 1998 or Filipov and
Marcus, 1997).
3competition from imported goods, was mainly generated through revenues from the oil
and gas industry.2
Finally, it would appear that restructuring might now become the main economic
(policy) agenda in the upcoming years since the domestic market becomes increasingly
important for Russian manufacturers. Only a technological and managerial upgrading,
through a fundamental restructuring of Russia’s industrial sector, will generate the
necessary momentum to put an end to Russia’s economic and social debacle and
preserve Russia’s territorial unity.
2. Historical Review
2.1 1987 to 1991: Progressing sclerosis due to power struggles on
vertical and horizontal dimensions
Until 1989, reforms took place at the periphery of the Soviet economic system. In the
official debates, they were seen as no more than useful subsidiary changes that would
provide support for the main task of reforming the publicly owned and state managed
economy. During the 80s, the Soviet system was governed by a thin elite layer who
controlled all effective decision-making and resources. Senior bureaucrats and managers
were no longer afraid of the supreme leaders. It was argued that even before Gorbachev
came into power, mechanisms for controlling bureaucrats and vital information flows in
key Soviet organizations were weak, thereby allowing these individuals great latitude in
their actions, which were mainly guided by personal benefit and preferences. Aslund
(1999) argues that through the Law on Cooperatives, management theft was effectively
legalized.3 The mechanisms and the institutional design of this scheme, which made
former top communists the wealthiest capitalists in the world, are described in greater
detail in Kotz and Weir (1997). The basic structures we try to understand today have
their roots in this period. The basic logic of business structures has not changed much in
the meantime and the last series of political leaders indicate a reversal to perestroika
politics.
The main aim of perestroika in the economy was to introduce elements of market
regulation within the main public sector of the economy while, at the same time,
maintaining the general framework of state ownership and centralized economic
management. However, in 1989, only a few years after the implementation of the Law
on Cooperatives, a radical shift in the policy agenda occurred. The next set of reforms
sought not only to decrease the role of the state in economic management, but also to
introduce new forms of property relations in the state sector taking a more gradual
approach by using the European social-democratic system as a model. As far as reforms
affecting the peripheral economy were concerned, the Gorbachev leadership hoped that
the reforms introduced would create healthy competition from the cooperatives to
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 If we apply a similar logic of the virtual economy to western economies we would very quickly discover
that most of our economies are virtual.
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 This allowed managers of state enterprises to establish private enterprises, which undertook arbitrage
with the state enterprise they were managing, transferring the profit of state enterprises to management-
owned private enterprises. Commercial banks became the most prominent new free-wheeling
cooperatives.
4stimulate state managers into improving their own performance and behavior according
to market criteria. For example, the Abalkin reform envisaged that by 1995 some 80–
90% of the output would be determined by the market, and some 35% of property
would be outside direct state ownership (Ekonimicheskaya Gazeta No. 44, 1989).
However, it should be acknowledged that any movement of reform activities would
eventually conflict with the more conservative powers of the Soviet system.
Brzezinski and Huntington (1991) describe the way of policy initiation in the Soviet
system as “trickle down”. In this system of elite politics, the Party’s Central Committee
formulated policy initiatives, then mobilized resources, and monitored compliance
where the crucial terrain of battle, the top leadership, was rather weak. Prior to 1989,
Gorbachev personally took very little part in the discussions of economic reform. After
the initial changes of personnel, which availed reformers more prominent positions,
there was a return to more conservative influences as Gosplan and other central organs
of the Council of Ministers proceeded to consolidate control of the reform commission
(Aslund, 1990). At that time, the reformers tried to increase their power via the political
reform program of democratization of the political system, through a new popularly
elected legislature and more open public debates on policy issues. This should have
provided a counterweight against the resistance to the reforms by the ministries and
local party organizations (Cox, 1996). This resistance was already well organized in
unions of industrialists and bankers on one side and as networks of party secretaries,
such as the Siberian Agreement or the Big Volga Association arranging the
interregional barter trade, on the other.
By early 1989, however, economic reform was back on the agenda and was again
attracting Gorbachev’s and other senior politicians’ attention mainly because of the
growing awareness of the upcoming economic crisis despite the implemented policy
actions. The party leadership realized that solutions to the problems needed to be sought
through more radical steps. At the same time, it was becoming increasingly clear to the
party leadership that if such a loosening of control were to be achieved, further moves
would have to be introduced to limit the power of the economic “prosloika” formed by
chief administrators in the economic ministries and their hold on the state enterprises.
But support from the population was lacking, probably due to the anti-alcohol campaign
introduced in Gorbachev’s first two years in power (Schroeder, 1992), which not only
had a psychological effect but more importantly, it increased shortages on other goods,
especially sugar for the production of self-made vodka (“samogonka”). The increasing
scarcity of supplies started to shake the pillars on which the Soviet economic and
political economy rested. Woodruff (1999) identified three pillars:
1. Monetary system ensuring macroeconomic balance.
2. Vertical bargaining economy of the planned economy.
3. Horizontal bargaining economy, which was organized by regional “apparatchiki” on
a barter basis affirming the political weight of the Party.
The first pillar corroded while the other two, in their principal nature, are still solidly
standing. The only difference is that most rules of the formal game disappeared and that
the number of actors increased.
52.2 1992 to1993: Shock therapying leads to a free falling economy
Gorbachev’s 500 day plan and Gaidar’s shock therapy are rooted in the same Soviet-
style of economic thinking in the sense that they did not emerge from consultation with
the people, parliament, and the already existing business community. The market reform
package was launched in January 1992 just after the Soviet Union disintegrated. The
federal deficit was reduced to zero from a former estimated high of 21%, according to
the IMF. This was achieved mainly by a cutback in subsidies to consumers, industry
and, very importantly, local governments. Military industry saw a reduction of funds by
about 70% which, among others, contributed to a strong political polarization between
the more technocratic team of reformers and the left-wing regulators. Surging inflation
depleted individual savings and the social safety net and core governmental services
disappeared. The shock therapy already failed in its initial state. Inflation control of the
first month of 1992 did not endure beyond the fall of 1992, because the microeconomic
units did not respond to price signals according to market economy norms.
Macroeconomic stabilization did not materialize mostly because monetary control,
fiscal discipline and foreign aid were actually harder to obtain than textbooks suggested.
The government failed to build a fundamental consensus among the major political and
economic actors to jointly build a civil society with market principles guiding economic
exchange. Instead, Russia was managed by highly organized polito-economic business
networks, which were guided by their own interests of rent extraction and political
power. The control over politics and media should secure future rents and privileges.
Trade liberalization opened vast windows of opportunities to transfer rents from mostly
the natural wealth of Russia to the personal bank accounts of masterminds of polito-
economic business networks. Trade liberalization not only lead to enormous capital
flight through exports, but increasing import pressure systematically replaced Russian
goods with imports from the domestic consumption basket, killing most of the
industries that operated on the domestic market. Trade liberalization has to be seen
combined with a real ruble appreciation by keeping the inflation rate ahead of the
nominal depreciation rate, which not only turned out to be rather expensive but also hurt
Russian producers. Import penetration had soon reached the level of 60–70%.
Productive capacities were largely underutilized and failed, and due to lacking revenues
and increased costs were unable to allocate investment capital for restructuring. In
addition, legal and political uncertainty did not create an inviting investment climate.
Although the macro-economic variables were still triste, Boris Yeltsin gave the green
light to the voucher privatization program that was launched in mid 1993. It was clear
that private ownership would keep the momentum of reform going and the probability
of returning to a Soviet-type regime would be reduced. In the first privatization wave,
less productive and non-strategic assets were privatized. Due to the fact that money was
earned through trade and on the speculative financial market, the interest in Russian
industry was small and stocks were changing owners at “throw away” prices. It was also
clear that efficiency changes were not to be expected from such an early privatization
program, because restructuring industrial assets did not make quick and good money.
More generally, it should be acknowledged that major stealing in Russia did not occur
through privatization and owning assets, but through protected and monopolized
arbitrage in trade and insider trade on speculative financial markets. Immediate returns
on productivity gains in industrial production were too low to be attractive for investors
thereby hampering effective restructuring.
63. Data and Methodology
Data stems originally from GOSKOMSTAT and were retrieved from IIASA’s
socioeconomic database. Measures for output, labor and capital were available for 22
individual industry aggregates across all 89 subjects of the Russian Federation between
1987 and 1993 on a yearly basis. Industrial output on different aggregations was
available from 1987 to 1997. This data set was, however, not used for the growth
regressions. Large-scale inconsistencies in the statistical data increased over time. It is
believed that the major tendencies already became apparent in 1993 when reporting was
still better. The correlation of nominal output between 1993 and 1997 was 94%, which
appears to be rather high. For a more detailed discussion on data issues see Kuboniwa
(1999).
Efficiency is measured by the use of a non-parametric method called Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) and is described in greater detail in Obersteiner (1999) and Ali and
Seiford (1994). Efficiency in the context of the analysis can briefly be described as the
difference between the benchmark input-output relation defined by the computed
production frontier surface and the actual input-output relation of each industry in each
region. In other words, efficiency can be defined as the difference between the best
practice or benchmark input-output and actual input-output relation.
The parametric models that were applied are described in Greene (1993). The results of
the estimation of Cobb-Douglas production functions are shown below. The more
flexible translog production function and econometric frontier functions in both the
Cobb-Douglas and translog functional form were also estimated with the purpose of
estimating and comparing efficiency scores. It turned out that the econometric
efficiency scores of regions and industries were only very weakly correlated with
efficiency scores. The correlation coefficients between the DEA efficiencies and Cobb-
Douglas efficiencies, using both the Battese and Coelli (1992) frontier function and the
two way error component fixed effects model, did not exceed 10%. When we used the
translog specification, it turned out that the estimated efficiencies were almost
indistinguishably small. This suggests that the DEA envelopment hull (which envelops
the surface of the data cloud) is significantly different from the production function
(which is a fitted line through the average of the data cloud). The difference in the
constructed benchmark surface might be related to outliers. However, the units that
constructed the hull were not identified as outliers after individual inspection. Due to the
fact that DEA is a non-parametric approach, which better fits applications in non-
competitive markets, we decided to continue with DEA efficiency scores, which also
appeared to be plausible after individual inspection.
74. Results
4.1 Output decline between 1987 to 1997
Table 1: Overview of nominal regional industrial output (Y) in million rubles, indicators
of change, and share of industrial output in the economy.
Y_1987 Y_1997 Index of
change
Contribution
to change
Shift share
1997/1987
Share of
industry on
GDP in 1996
Russian Federation 511951668 1582998193 0.4703 0.5516
Adygei Rep. 724588 1059829 0.2225 0.0004 0.5287 0.3560
Altai Rep. 121573 163721 0.2048 0.0000 0.4868 0.0763
Altai T. 7412970 15326339 0.3144 0.0087 0.7474 0.5807
Amur Reg. 1663044 5495988 0.5026 0.0042 1.1946 0.2778
Arkhangelsk Reg. 4786433 12657444 0.4022 0.0087 0.9559 0.6608
Astrakhan Reg. 2022832 4541207 0.3414 0.0028 0.8115 0.4833
Bashkortostan Rep. 15016302 48187891 0.4881 0.0366 1.1600 0.8480
Belgorod Reg. 3945744 15413436 0.5941 0.0127 1.4120 0.8868
Bryansk Reg. 5036741 5869673 0.1772 0.0009 0.4213 0.4485
Buryat Rep. 2254368 5976267 0.4032 0.0041 0.9583 0.5207
Chelyabinsk Reg. 18144436 53580696 0.4491 0.0391 1.0674 0.9806
Chita Reg. 1879625 5117724 0.4141 0.0036 0.9842 0.3450
Chuvash Rep. 4095314 7967493 0.2959 0.0043 0.7033 0.6968
Irkutsk Reg. 10956657 31357464 0.4353 0.0225 1.0345 0.6427
Ivanovo Reg. 7973903 7145001 0.1363 -0.0009 0.3239 0.7296
Kabardino-Balkar Rep. 1800846 2405397 0.2031 0.0007 0.4828 0.3967
Kaliningrad Reg. 2780207 4832096 0.2643 0.0023 0.6283 0.4783
Kalmyk Rep. 255324 664737 0.3960 0.0005 0.9411 0.3564
Kaluga Reg. 3076598 6438350 0.3183 0.0037 0.7565 0.5350
Kamchatka Reg. 2054756 5509844 0.4078 0.0038 0.9693 0.6599
Karachai-Cherkess Rep. 903390 1288605 0.2169 0.0004 0.5156 0.4938
Kemerovo Reg. 12094969 41392376 0.5205 0.0324 1.2371 0.8925
Khabarovsk T. 6144100 13570212 0.3359 0.0082 0.7984 0.5269
Khakass Rep. 2111018 5302808 0.3820 0.0035 0.9080 0.7175
Kirov Reg. 5207153 11863394 0.3465 0.0074 0.8235 0.6711
Komi Rep. 3799861 15515984 0.6210 0.0129 1.4760 0.5346
Kostroma Reg. 2479819 5430294 0.3330 0.0033 0.7916 0.6036
Krasnodar T. 10216956 19983508 0.2975 0.0108 0.7070 0.3682
Krasnoyarsk T. 13759101 49789938 0.5504 0.0398 1.3081 0.7473
Kurgan Reg. 2907132 5748638 0.3007 0.0031 0.7148 0.5792
Kursk Reg. 4213294 11482592 0.4145 0.0080 0.9851 0.7284
Leningrad Reg. 5891792 14869716 0.3838 0.0099 0.9123 0.7346
Lipetsk Reg. 4893602 19635209 0.6102 0.0163 1.4504 1.1922
8Magadan Reg. 2095166 4371196 0.3173 0.0025 0.7542 0.5137
Primorsky T. 6949301 18846667 0.4125 0.0131 0.9803 0.6777
Mariy El Rep. 1762395 3747427 0.3234 0.0022 0.7686 0.5599
Moscow 30726608 96622182 0.4782 0.0728 1.1367 0.3023
Moscow Reg. 25297898 40208581 0.2417 0.0165 0.5745 0.5774
Murmansk Reg. 5074920 16629274 0.4984 0.0128 1.1845 0.8021
Nizhny Novgorod Reg. 15785347 41512489 0.4000 0.0284 0.9506 0.6984
North Ossetian Rep. 1500072 1406355 0.1426 -0.0001 0.3389 0.0000
Novgorod Reg. 2181780 6165770 0.4298 0.0044 1.0215 0.6990
Novosibirsk Reg. 8050951 16042117 0.3030 0.0088 0.7203 0.4638
Omsk Reg. 7528355 24458058 0.4941 0.0187 1.1744 0.6570
Orel Reg. 2978887 9197920 0.4696 0.0069 1.1161 2.5440
Orenburg Reg. 7718354 23205539 0.4573 0.0171 1.0868 0.1651
Penza Reg. 3955835 8278740 0.3183 0.0048 0.7565 0.5830
Perm Reg. 11726824 38607950 0.5007 0.0297 1.1901 0.6805
Pskov Reg. 2064777 3337913 0.2459 0.0014 0.5844 0.4793
Rep. Dagestan 1946811 1751922 0.1369 -0.0002 0.3253 0.1917
Rep. Karelia 2537987 7139800 0.4278 0.0051 1.0169 0.7149
Rep. Mordovia 2731626 5774916 0.3215 0.0034 0.7642 0.6067
Rostov Reg. 12640674 23006876 0.2768 0.0114 0.6579 0.7250
Ryazan Reg. 5632502 10628435 0.2870 0.0055 0.6821 0.7520
Sakha Rep. 2813193 16935893 0.9156 0.0156 2.1761 0.5275
Sakhalin Reg. 2711235 6196065 0.3476 0.0038 0.8261 0.6192
Samara Reg. 15010733 56864099 0.5761 0.0462 1.3694 0.8003
Saratov Reg. 8152187 16722332 0.3120 0.0095 0.7415 0.4341
Smolensk Reg. 3932667 7883648 0.3049 0.0044 0.7246 0.6680
St. Petersburg 18868697 37381323 0.3013 0.0204 0.7161 0.5271
Stavropol T. 5206848 11452744 0.3345 0.0069 0.7951 0.5369
Sverdlovsk Reg. 22721349 64424443 0.4312 0.0461 1.0249 0.8429
Tambov Reg. 3773958 5494390 0.2214 0.0019 0.5263 0.5689
Tatarstan Rep. 14754678 49948068 0.5148 0.0389 1.2237 0.6786
Tomsk Reg. 2591530 10926669 0.6412 0.0092 1.5241 0.6334
Tula Reg. 7391922 15255241 0.3139 0.0087 0.7460 0.5886
Tuva Rep. 211380 371790 0.2675 0.0002 0.6358 0.2469
Tver Reg. 5625697 11409342 0.3084 0.0064 0.7331 0.8970
Tyumen Reg. 19527105 128394705 1.0000 0.1202 2.3768 0.5518
Udmurt Rep. 5604944 15719397 0.4265 0.0112 1.0138 0.6847
Ulyanovsk Reg. 5120323 13801886 0.4100 0.0096 0.9744 0.8126
Vladimir Reg. 7986985 12764041 0.2431 0.0053 0.5777 0.8519
Volgograd Reg. 9517505 21790021 0.3482 0.0136 0.8276 0.7039
Vologda Reg. 5741050 24994908 0.6621 0.0213 1.5738 1.1672
Voronezh Reg. 7252177 15384723 0.3226 0.0090 0.7668 0.6007
Yaroslavl Reg. 6558793 17398543 0.4034 0.0120 0.9589 0.8214
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. The index of change is the normalized relative growth of nominal
industrial output between 1987 and 1997. The contribution of change can be interpreted
as the region’s contribution to the nominal change of industrial output of all regions,
and finally the shift share is just the ration of the region’s contribution to total industrial
output to that of the Russian Federation between 1997 and 1987. The share of industry
output on regional GDP in 1996 provides some light on serious data uncertainties. A
share larger than one is, by definition, not possible and a share of the service sector (not
industry) of over 40% in major northern oil drilling regions, such as Tyumen, are very
doubtful. This means that errors, which are usually assumed to be equal across all
regions (e.g., share of gray economy), are unlikely to exhibit consistent properties.
Thus, data analysis can and should only be used to a limited extent for empirical
verification purposes for any kind of theoretical reasoning. It is also highly questionable
to draw any kind of useful policy conclusions from empirical analysis. The application
of econometric models for causality testing should be avoided. However, it is observed
that data uncertainties and their scientific consequences are rarely discussed among
transition economists.
Table 2: Overview of nominal industry output (Y in 1987 and 1997) in million rubles,
indicators of change, and share of industrial output in the economy.
Y_1987 Y_1997 Index of
change
Contribution
to change, %
Shift share
87/97
Share in
1987, %
Share in
1997, %
Chemical 36340488 91849472 0.24 5.56 0.845883   7.24   6.12
Construction 19274765 57696768 0.28 3.85 1.001814   3.84   3.85
Electric power 22333965 238502307 1.00 21.66 3.573973   4.45 15.90
Ferrous metallurgy 28910246 242249660 0.78 21.37 2.804374   5.76 16.15
Flour 12781697 29216147 0.21 1.65 0.764996   2.55   1.95
Food 64606032 172319088 0.25 10.79 0.892657 12.87 11.49
Forest 28657300 51463388 0.17 2.28 0.601018   5.71   3.43
Fuel 44092793 248502307 0.53 20.48 1.886198   8.78 16.56
Glass 1595632 4361151 0.26 0.28 0.91473   0.32   0.29
Light 62996849 32438229 0.05 -3.06 0.172331 12.55   2.16
Machine 1.56E+08 254900524 0.15 9.94 0.547926 31.01 16.99
Non-ferrous metal 24802130 76717896 0.29 5.20 1.035219   4.94   5.11
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The results from Table 1, covering the performance of the individual subjects of the
Russian Federation, are directly linked to the industrial structure. It can be seen that
regions, which are endowed with exploitable and exportable natural resources, such as
Tyumen (oil), Sakha (non-ferrous metal and diamonds, and Komi (fuel, forest,
electricity), are leading (see industrial structure, Table 3). Regions, which are mainly
dependent on the food industry, machine building, traditional chemical industry and
light industry are losing. From Table 2, it can be seen that the light industry, thus,
regions depending on the light industry (e.g., Ivanov), faced the sharpest decline.
Machine building and forest industry follow the light industry as under-performers.
Further characteristics are that under-performing regions are either regions with a high
non-Russian and low educated population or regions with a high share of agriculture
and/or large share of military industry. It appears that only the city of Moscow, which
was probably also a military industry center previously, managed to avoid a dramatic
industrial decline. Moscow could profit from the ‘entry port’ effect and spillovers from
the financial and service economy.
Table 3: Industrial structure (in percent of industrial regional output in 1996) of the top
10 and bottom 10 regions.
Top 10 Chem-
icals
Con-
struction
Electric
power
Ferrous
metals
Flour Food
For-
estry
Fuel Glass Light
Ma-
chines
Non-
ferrous
metals
Other
Tyumen Reg.  1.1   1.6 10.2   0.0 0.7  2.3   1.0 80.2 0.0 0.3   2.4   0.0 0.2
Sakha (Yakut)
Republic
 0.0   3.4 12.4   0.1 0.0  7.6   1.5 16.4 0.0 0.4   2.2 54.5 1.5
Vologda Reg.  6.7 11.8  9.9 51.4 1.0  5.7   5.9   0.5 0.3 0.7   5.2   0.2 0.7
Tomsk Reg. 22.6   4.4 11.9   0.3 2.6  6.5   4.3 33.9 0.1 0.3 11.4   0.0 1.7
Komi Republic  0.0   4.1 20.0   0.0 0.1  5.5 16.5 46.9 0.0 1.7   3.2   0.0 2.0
Lipetsk Reg.  1.1   3.5 12.9 56.4 1.3  9.5   0.2   0.0 0.0 0.4 14.0   0.0 0.7
Belgorod Reg.  2.4   8.1 13.2 41.5 2.6 16.6   0.6   0.0 0.0 0.7 13.7   0.0 0.6
Samara Reg.  9.6   3.1 11.8   0.1 1.3  6.7   0.6 12.5 0.1 0.6 51.3   1.7 0.6
Krasnoyarsk T.  7.2   3.4 12.2   0.7 1.2  6.7   6.2 11.1 0.0 0.8   6.2 42.6 1.7
Kemerovo
Reg.
 6.0   3.4 12.3 28.6 1.3  4.9   1.1 31.0 0.2 0.6   6.7   2.8 1.1
Bottom 10
Ivanovo Reg.   3.2   3.2 21.0 0.0 3.0 16.6   2.9   0.1 0.0 32.6 16.5   0.0 0.9
Republic
Dagestan
  2.8 14.5 21.6 0.0 5.6 18.6   0.7 15.4 1.1  1.1 16.9   0.0 1.7
Bryansk Reg.   0.6 12.0 12.7 0.8 4.8 22.8   5.6   0.2 2.6  2.9 29.6   0.0 5.4
Kabardino-
Balkar
Republic
  0.3   7.4 24.2 0.0 4.3 21.8   0.8   0.0 0.0  5.4 29.9   3.2 2.7
Altai Republic   1.4 11.8   0.0 0.0 0.4 43.0 12.8   0.0 0.0  5.4   7.1 15.2 2.9
KarachaiCher
kess Republic
26.2 29.2 14.8 0.0 0.6 16.1   2.3   0.4 0.0  1.5   6.4   1.6 0.9
Tambov Reg. 16.3   4.9 20.4 0.2 5.4 22.9   1.6   0.0 0.0  3.4 24.1   0.0 0.8
Adygei
Republic
  0.7   8.3 10.0 0.0 3.5 43.5 14.3   1.6 0.0  0.8 12.9   0.0 4.4
Moscow Reg.   9.5   9.2   9.5 3.7 3.4 14.7   4.3   0.2 0.9  7.1 33.4   2.5 1.6
Vladimir Reg.   4.6   4.8 18.0 0.7 2.5   9.5   4.4   0.4 5.0  6.6 39.2   2.5 1.8
Pskov Reg.   0.1   5.1 18.1 0.1 3.8 22.8   4.1   0.1 0.5  5.7 35.9   0.1 3.6
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5. Efficiency Estimations with DEA
5.1 Efficiency
Table 4: Average and standard deviation of efficiency across all industries and regions
in 1987 and 1993.
Model Year Weighted Average Weighted Standard Deviation
CRS 1987 0.212276 0.173184
1993 0.165625 0.218403
VRS 1987 0.517159 0.365533
1993 0.642567 0.382588
Scale 1987 0.304883 0.192349
1993 0.476942 0.164185
From Table 4, it is not possible to judge whether the aggregate efficiency gains can be
observed in the course of transition. DEA is unit invariant, i.e., up and down scaling of
all variables does not matter, however, in our model the output and capital measures
were dramatically changing during the inflationary period after 1991, whereas labor,
which is a physical measure, was not subject to re-scaling. This made it impossible to
pool the data and infer efficiency changes over time. The input/output relations also
changed dramatically as shown in Section 6.
Thus, what we observe in Table 4 is the average distance of all regional industries to the
best practice technology in a particular year. Due to the large sample size, the difference
in the mean efficiency between 1987 and 1993 is significant on a 99% confidence
interval using the Student t-test. However, the direction of change is apparently
dependent on the model used. In the CRS case average efficiency declined and in the
VRS model the efficiency improved with the introduction of market principles. This
result is due to differences of the efficient hull constructed by the CRS and the VRS
model.
We can conclude from Table 4 that shock therapy led to a more diverse industry
structure (increase in the standard deviation of efficiency) although, on average, the
relative distance of inefficient industries to the best practice industries did not change.
When we try to split efficiency into inefficiencies of scale and technical inefficiency, we
find that efficiency of scale increased suggesting that new prices and output decline
rendered gigantic production less competitive. Output decline, however, made large
inefficient industries more economically viable through size adjustment. This is in line
with the results of an increase in the economies of scale measured by the production
IXQFWLRQDSSURDFKEHORZDQGE\WKHIDFWWKDWFRQFHQWUDWHGLQGXVWULHV XVXDOO\JLJDQWLF
RQWKHHQWHUSULVHOHYHO GHFOLQHGPRUHUDSLGO\
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5.2 Efficiencies and the regions
Table 5: Correlation between change in regional output (Y), industrial labor force (L),
and industrial fixed capital stock (K) between 1987 and 1993, and absolute
weighted efficiency (Eff_), change in weighted efficiency (Eff_ _87-Eff_ _93)
and weighted standard deviations (S.D. Eff_) using a region/industry panel
(1120 observations) and DEA (Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) and Constant
Returns to Scale (CRS)).
Y_87/Y_93 L_87/L_93 K_87/K_93
Eff_VRS_87 0.0669 -0,1001 0.138164
Eff_VRS_93 -0.4644 0,0541 0.042676
Eff_CRS_87 0.1163 -0,1583 0.447872
Eff_CRS_93 -0.3665 0,0117 0.135165
Eff_VRS_87-Eff_VRS_93 0.7083 -0.18669 0.102903
Eff_CRS_87-Eff_CRS_93 0.4671 -0.14811 0.253886
S.D. Eff_VRS_87 0.1162 -0.11595 0.140638
S.D. Eff_VRS_93 -0.4598 0.077588 0.068244
S.D. Eff_CRS_87 0.0867 -0.17264 0.412648
S.D. Eff_CRS_93 -0.2968 -0.02719 0.107941
5.2.1 Output decline
• Little correlation between efficiency in 1987 and output decline; the positive sign
indicates that regions that were more efficient in 1987 declined faster (Eff_87,
Y_87/Y_93).
• There is a strong negative correlation between the efficiency in 1993 and output
decline; the negative sign indicates that regions that were efficient in 1993 declined
slower (Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93).
• The strongest correlation can be found between the change in efficiency and change
in output; regions that improved in terms of efficiency were able to decline slower
(Eff_87-Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93).
• Regions that allowed for more diversity between industries within the region
declined slower (SD Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93).
5.2.2 Labor market
Overall there is weak correlation between efficiency indicators and labor force
developments. The correlation tends to indicate that regions that were more successful
in moving people out of the industrial labor force gained efficiency.
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5.2.3 Fixed capital
The change in capital stock seems to be higher correlated with efficiency indicators in
1987. This indicates that regions that were endowed with high productive assets
(possibly more modern assets) were able to devalue these assets faster than regions with
less productive assets. This might reflect differences in the political power of different
regions. During 1993, the first privatization waves started and managers had an
incentive to devalue the assets they wanted to take over. However, those regions that
were able to improve in terms of efficiency were endowed with assets that were not
easily depreciable. Highly diverse regions in terms of efficiency in 1987 depreciated
capital faster.
5.3 Efficiency and industry
Table 6: Correlation between change in industry output, labor and capital between 1987
and 1993 and absolute weighted efficiency, change in weighted efficiency and
weighted standard deviations using a region/industry panel and DEA.
Y_87/Y_93 L_87/L_93 K_87/K_93
Eff_VRS_87 -0.00393 -0.23985 -0.20262
Eff_VRS_93 -0.35742 -0.38591 -0.37648
Eff_CRS_87 -0.08196 -0.3598 -0.24844
Eff_CRS_93 -0.37342 -0.31965 -0.31976
Eff_VRS_87-Eff_VRS_93 0.502186 0.186421 0.229243
Eff_CRS_87-Eff_CRS_93 0.17719 -0.24235 -0.09077
S.D. Eff_VRS_87 0.140948 -0.05028 0.01897
S.D. Eff_VRS_93 -0.27929 -0.27694 -0.2921
S.D. Eff_CRS_87 -0.04556 -0.28885 -0.16921
S.D. Eff_CRS_93 -0.38631 -0.36248 -0.3194
5.3.1 Output decline
• There is little correlation between efficiency on the industry level in 1987 and
output decline (Eff_87, Y_87/Y_93). This suggests that output decline can not be
related to initial efficiencies of industries.
• There is a strong negative correlation between the efficiency in 1993 and output
decline; the negative sign indicates that industries that were efficient in 1993
declined slower (Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93).
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• The strongest correlation can be found between the change in efficiency and change
in output; industries that improved in terms of efficiency were able to decline slower
(Eff_87-Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93).
• Industries that allowed for more diversity in terms of efficiency across the regions
declined slower (SD Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93).
5.3.2 Labor market
Overall, there is a strong correlation between efficiency indicators and labor force
developments on the industry level. The correlation shows that industries that were
more efficient were able to discharge fewer people or were even able to absorb
additional labor. More diverse industries in terms of efficiency were, on the whole, able
to retain more labor.
5.3.3 Fixed capital
The change in capital stock seems to be strongly correlated with efficiency indicators in
1993 and 1987. This means that industries that were endowed with highly efficient
assets compared to other industries were able to devalue these assets slower than
industries with less efficient assets. This seems surprising due to the high importance of
industrial lobbying in the political power game, but the most efficient and productive
assets were still in the hands of the government, which might explain this empirical fact.
During 1993, the first privatization waves started and managers had an incentive to
devalue the assets they wanted to take over. However, in the first wave only less
productive assets were privatized. Those industries that were able to improve in terms of
efficiency were endowed with assets that were not easily depreciable. The increase in
efficiency must thus reflect price changes of the industrial output. Highly diverse
industries in terms of efficiency in 1993 depreciated capital slower.
5.4 Efficiency and market change
5.4.1 Output decline
• There is little correlation between efficiency in 1987 and output decline (Eff_87,
Y_87/Y_93) on both regional and industry levels. This suggests that the hypothesis
that output decline can not be related to initial efficiencies must be accepted i.e.
under the planned economy, economic efficiency was significantly different from
what market conditions would predict.
• There is a strong negative correlation between efficiency in 1993 and output decline;
the negative correlation indicates that those regions and industries that became
efficient in 1993 declined slower (Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). Of course, the high
correlation is, in part, explained by the fact that efficiency improvements are also
directly related to output changes.
• The strongest correlation can be found between the change in efficiency and change
in output; industries/regions that improved in terms of efficiency were able to
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decline slower (Eff_87-Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). Again, it should be kept in mind that
efficiency and output are not independent of each other.
• Industries/regions that allowed for more diversity in terms of efficiency declined
slower (SD Eff_93, Y_87/Y_93). Cross-subsidies to equalize relative productivity
result in being ineffective — a lesson we also had to learn in other parts of the
world.
5.4.2 Labor market
There is a negative correlation between the standard deviation of efficiency and a
change in labor for both region and industry in 1987. This is an argument for
restructuring industries/regions if labor mobility within the industry/regions is possible
(geographic restriction). It appears that in ‘winning’ regions/industry the labor market is
rather flexible both in terms of inter-industry (including the service sector, i.e., exiting
industry) and geographic mobility. High labor mobility might be related to the relatively
high education levels of the labor force in such regions/industries.
5.4.3 Fixed capital
Initially, it would appear that the results of the correlation of change in the value and
efficiency assets among regions and industries seem to be contradictory. The correlation
coefficients between the capital ratio and levels and the standard deviation of efficiency
show different directions, while changes in efficiency are positively related to capital
depreciation. This inconsistency indicates that the system of ‘economica soglasovanii’
(negotiated economy: requires that economic policy and the allocation of economic
resources be determined by representatives of the major sectoral interests according to
formal procedures of negotiation (Fortescue, 1997)) collapsed and the fate of economic
power shifted to particular regions with specific industrial constellations. In other
words, economic success can be better understood by looking at the (industrial)
geography of Russia rather than looking at different sectors separately.
5.5 Market structure and efficiency
5.5.1 Concentration
We measure concentration by the Herfindahl index, which is equal to the sum of
squares of the market shares.  For the computation of the correlation in Table 7, a region
specific Herfindahl index is calculated.  It is a weighted index with the region’s specific
industry output as the weight.
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Table 7: Correlation between the weighted (industry output as weight) Herfindahl index
computed with data from 1987 and efficiency indicators of regions.
H-region
Y_87/Y_93 0.194475
L_87/L_93 -0.01287
K_87/K_93 0.612738
Eff_VRS_87 0.381214
Eff_VRS_93 0,230256
Eff_CRS_87 0.741117
Eff_CRS_93 0.089032
Eff_VRS_87-Eff_VRS_93 0.120176
Eff_CRS_87-Eff_CRS_93 0.55929
S.D. Eff_VRS_87 0.388036
S.D. Eff_VRS_93 0.21038
S.D. Eff_CRS_87 0.600324
S.D. Eff_CRS_93 0.048244
The main result from Table 7 is that regions that hosted more concentrated industries in
1987 declined faster. Regions with concentrated industries were able to devalue their
fixed assets at a higher rate than other regions. A higher devaluation of the physical
capital might be due to scale inefficiencies. Changes in labor are not correlated with
concentration, indicating that large scale production complexes, which are usually of
town forming character, showed a more paternalistic management style, which led to
labor hoarding. However, during 1991–1993 labor hoarding was common practice and
gave enterprise directors a stronger weight in negotiation over subsidies. Labor was
employed, though hardly paid, which led workers to search for opportunities outside the
enterprise without officially leaving the company. Efficiency was higher correlated with
the Herfindahl index in 1987 than in 1993, which is another indication that size became
less of a comparative advantage. There is also a decrease in the correlation between the
standard deviation of efficiency and concentration.
Initial efficiency is positively related to concentration. Regions with more concentrated
industries were favored in the old system of a planned economy. The price and subsidy
scheme of the planned economy overvalued scale effects — gigantophily. This might
however, be related to the fact that most concentrated industries were located in remote
areas of Siberia and scale effects were becoming effective only by providing services
(schools, duties of municipalities, etc.) — a factor that is completely ignored in classical
economic analysis. Industrial production in remote areas was severely hit by the
economic reform package, which abandoned transport subsidies overnight. Thus,
concentration might also be measuring the physical distance to the market.
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Regions with more concentrated industry were more diverse with respect to efficiency,
i.e., one or more large and (in-)efficient leader industries were surrounded by inefficient
industries, producing (food, construction materials, etc.). However, as prices started to
adapt the difference in efficiency disappeared (probably by passing the cost of (in-)
efficiency to the up-and-down stream industries).
6. Regression Results
For the computation of the regression results shown in Tables 8 and 9 regional
industrial output growth was regressed against efficiency change (VRS and CRS),
change of the Herfindahl concentration index and the localization index. The model was
estimated in logarithms and the change was measured between 1987 and 1993.
Table 8: Growth regression (R2=0.71, D.F. = 1036)
Variable Coefficient StandardError b/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] Mean of X
VRS efficiency
   score
0.6308198 0.24559E-01 25.686 0.00000 0.3225
Herfinadahl
   concentration
   index
-0.1817912E-01 0.32359E-02 -5.618 0.00000 -7.779
Localization
   index 0.4453849 0.23729E-01 18.769 0.00000 0.2260E-01
Table 9: Growth regression (R2=0.72, D.F. = 1036)
Variable Coefficient StandardError b/St.Er P[|Z|>z] Mean of X
CRS efficiency
   score
0.6233491 0.22907E-01 27.213 0.00000 0.2860
Herfinadahl
   concentration
   index
-0.6988807E-02 0.31838E-02 -2.195 0.02816 -7.779
Localization
   index 0.4483160 0.22905E-01 19.572 0.00000 0.2260E-01
Economic growth or slow decline is, according to the regression results, positively
related to efficiency gains, negatively associated with concentration, and regions benefit
if they host localized industries. Coefficients are almost identical for both models. Due
to the large sample size, all coefficients are statistically significant.
The localization index is computed by the ratio between the industry’s share in a
particular region and the industry’s share in the nation. There is also indication that
efficiency improvement is associated with increased localization. In addition, more
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localized regions, those who were already or had become localized, performed better
both in output measures and discarding labor.
In both regression models, over 70% of the variation of the growth pattern was captured
by the simple linear model using the change of efficiency, concentration and
localization. The model was estimated as a two-way error component fixed effects
model with region and industry dummies as effects.
7. Estimation of Cobb-Douglas Production Functions From
1987 to 1993
A common production function, Cobb-Douglas, was estimated over all of the regions
and industries. The purpose of the estimation is to find indications of shifts in the
contribution of the two major input factors, labor and capital, to output and to estimate
economies of scale in industrial production. There are two interesting results from the
estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production function of industry aggregates on the
regional scale. It is assumed that the coefficients are time dependent and panels were
estimated across regions and industries for each year individually. It can be concluded
that the initial shock therapy led to (see also Figure 1):
1. an increase in the economies of scale by some 10%, and
2. a decrease in the capital share and increase in labor share, both by some 30%.
Figure 1 : Labor and capital coefficients using the fixed effects model
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8. Discussion
8.1 Efficiency and market structure
Changes in efficiency, as defined by the model, can occur for various reasons. During
transition, Russian industries were exposed to both supply and demand sided shocks.
These shocks altered the relative competitive position of industries and regions
measured in efficiency terms. Price liberalization changed the cost of labor, the cost of
intermediary inputs and raw materials, cost and value of assets, and finally the cost of
transportation. Liberalization also meant that monopolies could exercise market power.
This especially applies to the energy and transportation sector. The revelation of the real
costs for energy and transportation, in combination with exercised monopoly power,
had great impacts on the geography of industrial production in the resource-based
(assets are non-transferable) economy of Russia. It should be noted that these
monopolies did not appear in our analysis as concentrated industries; on the contrary,
utilities are ubiquitous. Monopolies were not only present in the energy and
transportation sector, but at least equally important was the monopoly on information.
Monopolies on information are hardly discussed in the economic analysis on transition.
However, information constraints played an important role at a time when supply chains
started to disintegrate and domestic and foreign trade activities were channeled through
specific trade organizations. These organizations were partly inherited from the past or
were created from existing structures, which were either of criminal nature or a network
of bureaucrats and technocrats who converted their former political power into an
economic asset.
With the emergence of barter trade as one of the major forms of non-monetary payment
leading to a demonetization of the economy, large enterprise arrears came into place.
Barter trade had detrimental effects on the efficiency of enterprise operations and not
only had adverse effects on the current inefficiency of enterprises but also, and probably
more importantly, created incentives to avoid restructuring and invited rent extraction
instead. Also, the governments’ willingness to accept soft goods as tax offsets, that is to
give additional incentives to avoid restructuring or not restructure at all. Output, for
which there was large import pressure and declining purchasing power of domestic
consumers, could still be produced in the barter economy. In addition, due to a number
of reasons, which are mainly related to the continuation of paternalistic principles of
relational enterprise networks, many economically non-viable products continued to be
produced, although one has to admit that rapid trade liberalization led to excessive
import pressure leaving domestic producers with no competitive edge. Furthermore,
industries relying on intermediary inputs had to increase their inventories, which
depleted resources for other company activities. All these factors questioned the value
and interpretability of the results gained from monetary output measures. However, we
were more interested in the factors determining the relative competitiveness of an
industry or region rather than growth accounting. In this respect our results are
somewhat more informative.
Inefficiencies arise when capacities are under-utilized due to a lack in demand. The
under-utilization of capacities is the main source of inefficiency. In 1996, the index of
physical output relative to the 1990 level for the Russian Federation was down to 48%
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(GosKomStat, 1997), which is way below the optimal level. Thus, although the DEA
results are not conclusive with respect to efficiency gains, it can be concluded that
transition due to the historically unprecedented industrial decline triggered by major fall
backs of demand, did bring about large-scale absolute inefficiencies. However, relative
scale efficiencies improved, as shown in Table 4. Demand shocks arose from a fall in
domestic purchasing power due to inflation, changes in the preferences of consumers
and changes of the goods basket towards foreign goods. So, for example, the physical
production of meat declined in 1996 to 30% — the same level as in 1990. The removal
of barriers to international trade caused an increase in output for certain exporting
industries, whereas other industries had to compete with foreign producers on the
domestic market, resulting in a reduced market share on the domestic market. Market
penetration of imported consumer goods was estimated to increase by 70% before
August 1998. Afterwards, domestic consumer goods could increase their share by some
50%.
Apart from changes in the macro-economic conditions, sector policies changed
considerably. In the system of a planned economy specific sectors, industries and
regions were favored over others through inter alia cross-subsidies, regulations
(including taxes), and artificial prices. The new economic conditions changed the
preferences for certain sectors and regions considerably. The most important and drastic
change was budgetary cuts to support military and space projects. There was hardly any
civil production that was not designed to be immediately adapted for military purposes.4
The geographic weight of attention changed to be more Russian centered and depended
upon the affinity to certain Kremlin circles. The policy measures taken to support
industry in the post Soviet period were achieved from subsidies within sector programs,
tax exemptions, special foreign trade allowances and recalculations in charges for
natural resource exploitation. There are many more policy measures and equally
important dysfunctioning or non-existent government functions and services that are
described elsewhere and need not be repeated here.
8.2 Production function
A number of explanations are possible in interpreting the increase in the degree of scale
economies in industrial production. The first explanation would be that, under the
Soviet system, the price structure was such that economies of scale did not become
apparent in the regional industry statistics. The reason for this might be politically
motivated since the existence of economies of scale would have meant that a certain
industry should be preferably located in a certain region, which would have
disequilibriated the political power among regional/industrial leaders. The other
explanation is that assets were devalued faster in large regional industries. This claim
would support the view that the powerful regional elites would have tried to devalue
their assets as much as possible to prepare for a cheap takeover in the upcoming
voucher privatization. However, the correlation between the level of output and change
in the value of capital was very weak and negative. There was, however, stronger
correlation (-0.14%) between the output in 1993 and the ratio between capital in 1987
                                               
4
 The most illustrative example is that cigarette producers could immediately be converted into amunition
factories.
21
and 1993, suggesting that larger regional industries could, on a relative scale, maintain
higher prices for output than the capital used.
Another aspect that we already mentioned, is that production of social services were
discontinued or entrusted to the municipalities, which revealed the true production
properties of industrial production. It should be noticed that the revelation of scale
economies goes hand-in-hand with output decline. Assets that were used for military
purposes or were simply obsolete were written off and the remaining assets now show
this property as increasing returns to scale. The existence of increasing returns will lead
to higher specialization and concentration of industrial production and increasing
disparity of industrial success within the subjects of the Russian Federation. As
industrial success can mainly be observed in resource extracting industries and such
industries and regions respectively have little incentive to share revenues with the rest
of Russia, one can predict that disputes over royalties and tax exceptions and their
distribution will increasingly lead to tensions between the resource rich hard currency
generating regions/industries and the central government, which for political reasons
will want to try to equalize the gap between poor and rich through transfers. Such
disputes have proved to be especially severe when combined with ethnic tensions. It can
thus be further predicted that, if the Russian economy continues to be dominated by
mainly resource extracting industries, the Federation will further disintegrate and ethnic
tensions will continue to rise. This makes Russia more vulnerable in blaming the
enemies of the Russian people to be responsible for the disintegration of the nation.
Only under the scenario that Russia will increasingly be able to tap its human capital —
Russia has one of the highest rates of tertiary education in the world — by restructuring
its manufacturing sector and building a high tech service sector, will Russia be able to
preserve its integrity and become an economic partner for the world economy.
Unlike resource extraction, manufacturing and services benefit from economic openness
and integration. The ‘Russian evil’ was killed successfully with shock therapy and
negligence in post shock medication, but the ones that understand the psychology of the
Russian people will know that, like Rasputin, Russia can and will come back to fight for
its place in the world. Certainly we still have the choice to help Russia become an
economic power or help Russia become a political military power. Both options can be
achieved through trade and investment. When we look at the sheer number of financial
and trade flows in and out of Russia, we discover that both international organizations
operating in Russia and international businesses successfully govern Russia towards the
second option.
Another interesting finding that is related to the computation of production functions is
the diverging trajectory of capital and labor coefficients. This can mostly be attributed
to the fact that the value of total capital changed 6.2 times faster than the value of total
output. There are a number of possible explanations for this diverging speed.
• Much of the capital assets were still kept in the Soviet books but were not employed
anymore and had to be written off. In addition, assets used for military purposes or
combined military-commercial purposes had to be reassessed (in 1992 military
spending was cut by about 70%).
• The value of capital was simply overpricing in the planned economy with respect to
its real market value. Thus, capital indicators were just accounting numbers during
the Soviet period with little economic meaning for the underlying assets.
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• The value of capital was intentionally de-(under-)valued to speed up privatization.
9. Conclusions
Our findings about the transition process in Russia indicate that:
• Due to a lack in demand for domestic products, large scale under-utilization of
capacities led to an increase of inefficiencies in industrial production.
• Highly concentrated industries declined faster.
• Localized industries declined slower.
• Regions that allowed for higher inter-industry diversity, in terms of efficiency,
declined slower.
• Properties of the production function exhibit constant returns to scale until 1991.
Thereafter, we observe a dramatic decline of the capital coefficient while the labor
coefficient increases. After 1991, the production function exhibits increasing returns
to scale properties.
• Value of installed capital decreased 6.2 times faster than the value of output over the
period 1987 to 1993.
In conclusion, we can assert that the initial ambitions of the economics textbook recipes
did not materialize. Shock therapy, which was followed by a slowing reform process
due to Kremlin power politics, led to the primitivization of the Russian industry. With
few exceptions, the exploitation of natural resources became the main sources of
revenue. A myriad of factors — e.g,. unpredictable macro-economic environment with
high and stochastic inflation and appreciating real exchange rates, the malfunctioning
court system, unclear property rights, lack of market information and business support
systems, uncertain and ineffective political leadership combined with historically deep
rooted suspicion against the state, lacking internal competition and overwhelming
import competition, etc. — left the Russian industry largely noncompetitive on the
domestic and international market for its manufactured goods.
In the last ten years, virtually no restructuring and investment happened, both in terms
of human and physical capital building, which created an endogenous dynamic of the
economic system that tends more toward an under-development trap than toward full
economic recovery. Only a strong political leadership or large international aid
packages, combined with reconsidered macro- and trade policies, will stop the current
downward spiral of the Russian economy ending increased inequality on all dimensions.
The basics of the core activities and responsibilities of the state need urgently to be
rebuilt. Industrial policies will have to be implemented that will help to close the large
productivity gap with the west and will exploit the innovativeness of Russian human
capital. Concentration on resource extraction industries, which in addition are driven by
the dynamics of scale economies in exploitation leading to further concentration of
wealth and power, will enhance the disintegration processes within the Russian
Federation and lead to a further escalation of social, political and ethnic tensions. Policy
measures that support manufacturing and services — sectors that benefit from openness,
knowledge spillovers and cooperation — will help to avoid a situation where Russia,
which is after all still the first or second nuclear super-power in the world, continues to
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be an unpredictable player in geopolitical disputes, but will make Russia an equal
trading partner for mutual benefit.
Western policy makers should understand that, in the long run, the west would receive
more profit from economic integration with Russia than from trade with cheap oil and
gas and other raw materials. Finally, the broader goal of sustainable, egalitarian and
democratic development is unlikely to happen in a natural resource dependent economy.
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